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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3138 
___________ 
 
YOUSELINE DOPHIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BANK OF AMERICA MORTGAGE COMPANY;  
BANK OF AMERICA HOME LOAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-14-cv-03193) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 1, 2016 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Youseline Dophin appeals the District Court’s order granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss her second amended complaint.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of review.  See Connelly v. 
Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
Dophin filed her initial complaint against defendant Bank of America, N.A. 
(BANA) in May 2014.  She alleged that she initially obtained a mortgage loan for her 
home from Countrywide, and that BANA took over the loan after acquiring Countrywide.  
She claimed, generally, that BANA is corrupt, has kept her from working, and otherwise 
caused her difficulties.  BANA filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The District Court granted BANA’s motion, but gave 
Dophin leave to amend her complaint.  Dophin filed an amended complaint, BANA filed 
another Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the District Court again granted the motion but invited 
amendment. 
Dophin then filed a second amended complaint, which is at issue in this appeal.  
She complained that BANA had acquired her mortgage without her consent, had limited 
her ability to work, had sent an employee to her home to talk to her without her 
permission, and had engaged in other debt collection or foreclosure activities.  She 
alleged that this conduct violated her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments; she also raised claims of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
unjust enrichment, and invasion of privacy.  BANA filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
and, after holding a hearing, the District Court granted BANA’s motion and dismissed 
3 
 
the second amended complaint with prejudice.  Dophin filed a timely notice of appeal to 
this Court. 
In support of her appeal, Dophin has filed an informal brief, which, instead of 
presenting specific challenges to the District Court’s opinion, states only, “I disagree with 
the Judge[’s] decision which my complaint is dismissed with prejudice.”  Br. at 1.  
Because Dophin is proceeding pro se, we construe her brief liberally.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007).  At the same time, we will review only 
those arguments that she has actually presented.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue 
an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”); see also Timson 
v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed 
by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed 
abandoned[.]” (internal citation omitted)).  Dophin has not adequately presented any 
issue for our review. 
In the interest of completeness, however, we have independently reviewed her 
claims and the District Court’s opinion, and conclude that the Court did not err in 
dismissing her second amended complaint.  To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s 
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  “Threadbare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice”; neither does “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
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As the District Court explained, while Dophin raised a host of legal theories, she 
has failed to state a claim under any theory.  To pursue a constitutional claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional 
or statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(emphasis added).  Dophin has made no effort to establish that BANA is a state actor, 
which is fatal to her constitutional claims.  See generally Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 
1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Further, while Dophin repeatedly accuses BANA of fraud, she has not identified a 
“material misrepresentation of fact” that she relied on to her detriment, which is the 
foundation of a fraud claim under New Jersey law.  See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 
F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007).  Her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim fails 
because her allegations that BANA took over her mortgage and that a BANA 
representative periodically visited her home do not involve conduct “so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  Ingraham 
v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 25 A.3d 1191, 1195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (quoting 
Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc’y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)).  Moreover, as 
the District Court explained, Dophin failed to plead any facts suggesting that BANA has 
been unjustly enriched.  See VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 
1994) (“To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show both that defendant 
received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.”). 
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Finally, Dophin failed to state a viable invasion-of-privacy claim.  Invasion of 
privacy involves “the intentional intrusion, ‘physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns’ that ‘would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person.’”  G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 319-20 (N.J. 2011) (quoting Bisbee 
v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 452 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)).  
The periodic visits from a BANA employee to Dophin’s home do not represent a 
sufficiently substantial intrusion to make out a claim.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 652B cmt. d (1977); see also Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc., 21 A.3d 650, 
654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (employing Restatement’s definition).  Likewise, 
Dophin’s vague allegations concerning BANA’s collection or foreclosure efforts do not 
state a plausible claim.  See Bisbee, 452 A.2d at 691-92; see also Lovgren v. Citizens 
First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. 1989).  Nor has Dophin 
explained how BANA’s acquiring her mortgage implicated her right to privacy.1 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
1 Dophin also presents conclusory allegations that BANA has been able to limit her 
employment opportunities because it provides banking services to her past employers.  
These allegations do not suffice to state a claim.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. 
Likewise, insofar as Dophin has raised any additional claims, we agree with the District 
Court that they lack merit.  Finally, we are satisfied that amendment to the complaint 
would be futile, and therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing 
the complaint without providing Dophin another opportunity to amend.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
